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Abstract
It is important to embrace the responsibility that comes with the new geological epoch 
of the Anthropocene, which, in terms of environmental law, requires nothing less than 
a radical revisiting of its basics tenets. In an attempt to incorporate the Anthropocene 
to my ongoing project on Critical Environmental Law, I examine it from three angles: 
grammar, theoretical perspective and methodology. Grammar refers to the need for a 
new, anthropocenic vocabulary that will deal with the challenges of the Anthropocene. 
To this effect, I suggest some terms, such as continuum/rupture, 
human/nonhuman/inhuman, as well as geologic immersion and planetary withdrawal. 
Theoretical perspective refers to the way current thinking changes or at least is 
affected by the Anthropocene – indeed, how current environmental legal thinking is 
turning in order to accommodate the needs of the new epoch. Finally, methodology 
refers to the way the Anthropocene changes the way we seek knowledge and the 
epistemological presuppositions of the limits of such knowledge. I offer four theses in 
the form of suggestions on how Critical Environmental Law needs to adapt 
methodologically in order to integrate the Anthropocenic grammar and perspective.
1. Introduction
The amount of text produced on the Anthropocene1 across the disciplines is rapidly 
generating a digital (and occasionally paper) imprint worthy of the geological imprint 
of its subject matter. One might even be tempted to talk of an ‘Anthropocene-turn’: as 
with the spatial turn,2 of which the Anthropocene is a close bedfellow, a new grammar 
is inaugurated, a different theoretical perspective is tried out, and an updated 
methodology ensues. The Anthropocene has managed to provide for all these new 
steps, influencing an unexpectedly large and broad variety of disciplines. 
Environmental law has not been left out of this wave,3 since, more than any other 
branch of law, it is directly involved in some of the fossilising and anthropogenic 
processes in the core of the Anthropocene. But so far, most attempts to deal with the 
Anthropocene from an environmental point of view have been partial,4 or even worse, 
espousing of the ubiquitous neoliberal ‘green’ economic agenda, entrusting the future 
1 P J Crutzen and E Stoermer, ‘The Anthropocene’ (2000) 41 IGBP Newsletter 17.
2 B Warf and S Arias (eds.), The Spatial Turn: Interdisciplinary Perspectives (New York, 
Routledge, 2009).
3 See for example, C Gonzalez, ‘Bridging the North-South Divide: International Environmental 
Law in the Anthropocene’ (2015) 32 Pace Environmental Law (PELR) Review, 407; D 
Houston, ‘Crisis Is Where We Live: Environmental Justice for the Anthropocene’ (2013) 
Globalizations, 10, 3, 439; see also N Robinson, ‘Fundamental Principles of Law for the 
Anthropocene?’ (2014) Environmental Policy and Law, 44, 1-2, 13, whose work on principles 
for the Anthropocene is based on strong ethical considerations.
4 Exceptions of course abound. See indicatively, A Grear, ‘Deconstructing Anthropos: A 
Critical Legal Reflection on “Anthropocentric” Law and Anthropocene “Humanity”’ (2015) Law 
and Critique, 26, 3, 225; S Adelman, ‘Climate justice, loss and damage and compensation for 
small island developing states’ (2016) Journal of Human Rights and the Environment, 7, 1, 32
of the planet to more technology, stronger (‘but cleaner’) industry, aggressive 
geoengineering, and other market-oriented mechanisms which sadly confirm 
Swyngedouw’s characterisation of the Anthropocene as the ‘opiate of the masses’.5
What is needed instead, is a return to the basics of the discipline of environmental law, 
and a reconsideration of some of its major tenets. Grammar, perspective and 
methodology of the Anthropocene, therefore, are the three focal points of this text. 
Briefly, grammar refers to the need for a new, anthropocenic vocabulary that will deal 
with the challenges of the Anthropocene and its introduction in social sciences and 
humanities in a way suitable to the disciplines but also faithful to the origin of the term. 
The theoretical perspective, on the other hand, refers to the way current thinking 
changes or at least is affected by the Anthropocene – indeed, how current thinking is 
turning in order to accommodate the needs of the new epoch. Finally, methodology 
refers to the way the Anthropocene changes the way we seek knowledge and the 
epistemological presuppositions of the limits of such knowledge. I will examine the first 
two in the context of environmental law, and will suggest an anthropocenic 
methodology in the form of what I have initiated elsewhere by the name Critical 
Environmental Law,6 namely a way of looking into the law that takes into consideration 
the various developments in other disciplines and on the planet as a whole.
Rather unsurprisingly, the law has been lagging behind in terms of riding the 
Anthropocene wagon. This is partly because the law is always characterised by a 
slower, more ponderous temporality, typically operating later than politics and certainly 
much later than most humanities and social sciences. The reasons for this are 
multiple, but perhaps the most obvious ones are the fact that law often operates as 
the final arbiter on events in which several other institutions have already been 
involved, such as politics, media, science and so on. Things end up in law, and for that 
reason, law carries the weight of confirming societal expectations. These expectations 
refer to the assumption that the circumstances will carry on being the way they have 
been so far, and that they can be relied upon not to change arbitrarily.7  This rather 
conservative aspect of the law is coupled to a more proactive and future-tending 
aspect, and the second main reason for which law is characterised by a slower 
temporality: the law is expected to bind the future. Every act and decision (if one 
wishes to look at the law narrowly), every legal spatialisation and expansion 
(geopolitical law), every legal gesture and movement (embodied law), and indeed 
every piece of legal research, bears the responsibility of capturing the future. This is 
simply because every piece of the legal system, to a smaller or greater extent, at the 
same time constructs the law and binds social expectations on how the law will be in 
the future. 
Environmental law is no exception to this, although its slow temporality might be more 
of a disappointment because of the different expectations we have of it.8 In view of the 
5 E Swyngedouw, ‘The non-political politics of climate change’ (2011) Acme 12, 1, 1.
6 A Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, ‘Towards a Critical Environmental Law’, in A Philippopoulos-
Mihalopoulos (ed), Law and Ecology: New Environmental Foundations (London, Routledge, 
2011).
7 N Luhmann, Law as a Social System, trans. K Ziegert (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
2004).
8 See for example Elizabeth Fisher’s ruminations on the particularities of environmental law 
as ‘hot law’ responding to ‘hot’ problems that lack an adequate knowledge base and involve 
urgency of environmental issues and the relatively uncrystallised nature of the 
particular branch of law, the expectations would be that environmental law would act 
faster and without the laboriousness that characterises the rest of the legal areas. 
These expectations are bound to be disappointed, since environmental law remains 
part of the legal machine that needs to reduce real facts into legal facts, while at the 
same time inserting itself into existing administrative legal mechanisms. Current 
environmental law, therefore, is as fast or as slow as the rest of the legal system, with 
occasional bouts of acceleration if the particular case, story or concept has been taken 
up by the media, politics, the economy or other spheres of social life. 
It would now seem, however, that the law has found its match. Geology is notoriously 
slow and so far has operated outside the speed demands of other disciplines. Its 
method relies on the construction of a continuity that spans vast durations before and 
indeed following human presence.9 Humans are often considered a brief interval in an 
otherwise multiscalar process that is concerned with what withstands time and 
therefore remains in time and space. But even geology is changing: with the 
emergence of the Anthropocene, lithostratigraphy is being complemented by 
biostratigraphy (namely, not just non-anthropogenic rocks but also urban 
environments created by humans). The focus is more zoomed in and as a 
consequence, the epistemic velocity speeds up. This, in combination to the fervour 
with which the Anthropocene as a new geological epoch has been embraced by 
various disciplines, has propelled the discipline of geology to an accelerated mode - 
so much that, as Bruno Latour puts it, “we find geologists flabbergasted by the quick 
pace of human history; a pace that forces them to try lodging a ‘golden spike’ in a span 
of two hundred or even of sixty years (depending on whether you prefer a short or very 
short temporal boundary demarcating the emergence of Anthropocene).”10 The term 
has provided us with a sizeable amount of interdisciplinary work by geology scholars 
that aim to converse with other disciplines in ways never occurring before. Although 
the discipline itself has stalled for a characteristically long time on its decision whether 
there is enough scientific evidence to accept the term,11 the Anthropocene has 
managed to mobilise an extraordinary inter- and even supra-disciplinary surge of 
interest – a great indication of which is also this very volume. We are all united in the 
search for our position with regards to the Anthropocene – or at least this is what it 
would seem. And why not? It is rare to witness and be offered the opportunity to 
cogitate on the change of a geological epoch, and the law must not abstain from it.
a plurality of parameters and agents. E Fisher, ‘Environmental Law as ‘Hot’ Law’ (2013) 
Journal of Environmental Law 25, 3, 347
9 See for example “Landscape modification will only persist as long as human land 
management persists; there will be a lag time, probably of a few centuries… After this, 
sedimentary processes will revert to approximately natural.” J Zalasiewicz et al., ‘Stratigraphy 
of the Anthropocene’ (2011) Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A, 369, 1036, 
1047, added emphasis.
10 B Latour, Facing Gaia: Six lectures on the political theology of nature (the Gifford Lectures 
on Natural Religion Edinburgh, 18th-28th of February 2013) 77, 
www.macaulay.cuny.edu/eportfolios/LATOUR-GIFFORD-SIX-LECTURES
11  See however the report of the Anthropocene Working Group of the 29th of August, 2016, to 
the International Geological Congress, subsequently to be considered by the International 
Commission on Stratigraphy for their final decision, on how the Anthropocene is 
stratigraphically verifiable, making the Anthropocene an official geological epoch.
In what follows, I embrace this responsibility of thinking of the new geological epoch 
which has been entirely instigated by us humans. I will suggest some new terms to 
deal with the Anthropocene from an environmental legal point of view, such as 
continuum/rupture, human/nonhuman/inhuman, as well as geologic immersion and 
planetary withdrawal. These are merely the tools in order to start constructing a 
theoretical perspective faithful to the Anthropocene and its demands, which takes 
place in section three of this text. To conclude, I offer four theses in the form of 
suggestions on how Critical Environmental Law needs to adapt in order to integrate 
the Anthropocenic grammar and perspective.
2. Anthropocenic Grammar
In the opening pages of his book Ecological Thought, Timothy Morton writes: “one of 
the things that modern society has damaged, along with ecosystems and species and 
the global climate, is thinking.”12 The kind of thinking Morton refers to, has been long 
forgotten in the name of problem-solving and solution-oriented practices. This does 
not mean that problem-solving precludes thinking. On the contrary, it demands a 
thinking that is specific, unidirectional and targeted. By definition it needs to bracket 
issues that are not immediately relevant and assume a temporality that targets the 
present and the immediate future. This mode of thinking is applied in most 
environmental legal production processes.13 The Anthropocene, however, opens up a 
different temporality and depth of thinking. It requires a focus that zooms out rather 
than in, observing humanity and its shenanigans from a distance. It requires a counter-
intuitive pause and an opening up to include previously thought irrelevant issues, 
planetary futures and inhuman bodies, as I show below. It demands a supra-
disciplinarity, some work on which must take place within the confines of every 
individual discipline (every discipline has the responsibility to start thinking of other 
disciplines) and also in unison as a collective emergence. 
The challenge for environmental law is considerable. It must expand beyond the 
increasing epistemic closure that always demands a return to the law and its habitual 
mechanisms, and consider other disciplines in both its theoretical and applied 
manifestation. Indeed, the latter is the lesser of the two problems: in any environmental 
legal statute or court decision there is an inherent interdisciplinarity that needs to bring 
together epistemic advances from science, ecology, politics and economy, to name a 
few. But this interdisciplinarity is instrumentalised and as such, does not reach beyond 
the law and its needs. The various disciplines become translated into law for the 
demands of the particular problem, with its pre-determined, mostly short-term 
temporality. This remains the case despite some of the more visionary legal concepts, 
such as the principle of intergenerational equity that urges towards a slightly ampler 
but ultimately still limited temporality, especially when compared to the Anthropocenic 
temporality. So, the main challenges for environmental law are: adopt an 
interdisciplinary approach that escapes the narrow instrumentalism of decision-
making, and extend this on a supra-disciplinary horizon of long-term futurity. 
12 T Morton, Ecological Thought (Harvard University Press, 2010) 4.
13 F Capra and U Mattei, The Ecology of Law:  Toward a Legal System in Tune with Nature 
and Community (Berrett-Koehler, 2015).
Similarly to what has been called the grammars of climate change,14 that refer to the 
questions of who speaks and how one speaks for pressing environmental issues, the 
need for a grammar of the Anthropocene is pressing and invites the re-emergence of 
a supra-disciplinary thinking of the kind in which Renaissance excelled. While a 
Renaissance breadth of knowledge would now be impossible due to the depth of 
specialised knowledge, an epistemic propensity towards supra-disciplinarity is the 
main grammatical invitation of the Anthropocene. In a way, this challenge is superior 
to the one augured by sustainable development – another mobilising concept that 
transcended disciplines. Indeed, very few concepts have managed to mobilise the 
various disciplines so fiercely and with such an effect on current thinking as the 
Anthropocene hypothesis. Let me, therefore, point to some of the new grammatical 
structures that are proposed with the Anthropocene.
First, the Anthropocene changes the way we understand the connection between 
humanity and the rest of the planet. It demands a fine, somewhat paradoxical, balance. 
On the one hand, an understanding that, not only do humans depend on the planet 
(which is in the basis of many anthropocentric theories where nature is protected as 
resource); not even that nature is central to humanity (in the way ecocentrism and 
Earth jurisprudence has it15); but that there is such a continuity between them and the 
rest of the planet that any distinction is often arbitrary and on the basis of partial 
interests. On the other hand, the Anthropocene invites a return of anthropos as a new 
political and legal body that embraces the scientific developments of posthumanism, 
and yet asserts that humans are not the same as other material and immaterial bodies 
that populate the planet.16 The oft-rehearsed deep-ecology notions of oneness in 
terms of human and non-human bodies points to a need for an ecological flatness that 
does not offer any criteria of distinction, and therefore cannot differentiate between the 
various bodies. It is important, therefore, to retain difference and even perhaps human 
priority. As Kathryn Yussof puts it, “this priority is isomorphic and is not something that 
should be flattened out in relation to other life/minerals (as some argumentation in the 
posthumanities inadvertently does).”17  The other end of the spectrum is, however, a 
human exceptionalism, the kind of which we often witness and practice, whether 
consciously or unconsciously. This is especially the case in law, which in its majority 
is characterised by anthropocentric values. Paradoxically, this needs to be managed 
as an anthropocenic asset in terms of retaining human responsibility. Yussof again: 
“[i]t is a case of negotiating human exceptionalism rather than trying to do away with 
it all together, because that elision negates the power and responsibility that comes 
with what is inherited as a consequence of our humanism (the ontological debt).”18 
14 C Barnett, P Cloke, N Clarke and A Malpass, Globalizing Responsibility: The Political 
Rationalities of Ethical Consumption (London, Blackwell, 2011).
15 What I suggest is different to ecocentrism in that, emphatically, here there is no centre yet 
there is difference. See my work on this in ‘Actors or spectators? Vulnerability and critical 
environmental law’, in A Grear and E Grant (eds), Thought, Law, Rights and Action in the Age 
of Environmental Crisis (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2015).
16 A Grear, ‘Deconstructing Anthropos: A Critical Legal Reflection on “Anthropocentric” Law 
and Anthropocene “Humanity”’ (2015) 26/3 Law and Critique 225-249.
17 K Yussof, ‘Geologic subjects: nonhuman origins, geomorphic aesthetics and the art of 
becoming inhuman’ (2015) Cultural Geographies, 22, 3, 383, 399.
18 Yussof, Geologic Subjects, 399-400.
In other words, the Anthropocene is inviting us to consider the connection between 
what I have called the indistinguishability between bodies on the one hand, and the 
de facto emergence of different bodies on the other. The indistinguishability between 
bodies refers to the way bodies are always assembled in collectivities with other 
bodies, to the point that the limits of a (human but also any other) body become 
actually and epistemically fuzzy. Bodies, in other words, constitute a continuum. I have 
elsewhere defined the continuum as the surface that cuts across animate and 
inanimate objects, bodies, discourses and so on.19 This continuum is not equivalent 
to a flat ontology, nor to the vastness of the plane of immanence (“the ‘holding 
together’ of heterogeneous elements.”20). It draws on Moira Gatens’s description as 
“a plane of experimentation, a mapping of extensive relations and intensive capacities 
that are mobile and dynamic”,21 in that it emphasises experimental and therefore 
unpredictable mobility of both material (extensive) and immaterial (intensive) bodies. 
It also draws on Jane Bennett’s “ontological field without any unequivocal 
demarcations between human, animal, vegetable or mineral. All forces and flows 
(materialities) are or can become lively, affective, and signaling … portions congeal 
into bodies, but not in a way that makes any one type the privileged site of agency.”22 
Indeed, the continuum I am suggesting here is acentral and multi-agentic, constituted 
of affective excess and of bodies melting into each other’s contours. But it is not flat, 
like much of current ontologies, new materialisms and some ecological thinking seem 
to suggest. It is instead a manifold, full of fissures and planes, heavily politicised by 
historical and geographical processes. It is also a tilted, power-structured surface, on 
which bodies move, rest and position themselves, affecting the tilt while being affected 
by it. Stronger bodies affect the continuum in radical ways, making it tilt according to 
their positions: the global North is stronger than the South; a corporation is often 
stronger than a singe individual; a collective is sometimes stronger than a developer; 
a tsunami is nearly always stronger than the holiday-makers, and global warming is 
stronger than all of us. 
The concept of indistinguishability refers to the commonality of all bodies as 
‘inhabitants’ of the continuum. But so far, the anthropocentric continuum reserved a 
special place for the human, indeed for Man. Think of the idea of ‘man’ as propagated 
in Enlightenment: a white male of ideal corporeal proportions, gifted with reason, 
common sense, knowledge, potential, ready to conquer the world.23 But we know now, 
after the extensive discussion on the posthuman, that the human has never been what 
we thought. The human is always mediated (by its body, by the space around it and 
by the space that the human body generates, by other bodies, whether human, 
natural, artificial, and so on). This is intimately connected to the fact that a body cannot 
be a neatly defined entity. The body does not have an outline. If they were a painting, 
19 A Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, Spatial Justice: Lawscape Body Atmosphere (London, 
Routledge, 2015).
20 G Deleuze and F Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. B 
Massumi (London, Athlone Press, 1988) 323; G Deleuze and F Guattari, What is Philosophy?, 
trans. H Tomlinson and G Burchell (New York, Columbia University Press, 1994) 141.
21 M Gatens, ‘Through a Spinozist Lens: Ethology, Difference, Power’, in P Patton (ed.), 
Deleuze: A Critical Reader (Oxford, Blackwell, 1996) 165.
22 J Bennett, Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things (Durham, Duke University Press, 
2010) 117.
23 See A Grear, ‘Challenging corporate 'humanity': legal disembodiment, embodiment and 
human rights’ (2007) Human Rights Law Review 7, 3, 511.
bodies would be Venetian dashes of colour without drawn linear boundaries, staging 
through their expansive leaking a radical withdrawal from the Florentine canon of 
humanist containment. Deleuze writes: “the edge of the forest is a limit. Does this 
mean that the forest is defined by its outline?...We can’t even specify the precise 
moment at which there is no more forest.”24 All bodies are leaking. By ‘all bodies’ I 
mean human and nonhuman. While in traditional environmental thinking, whenever 
included, nonhuman bodies have been either resource, context or the negative of the 
dialectics of humanity, here I follow the schools of thought largely identified as new 
materialisms, non-representational theory, speculative realism and object-oriented 
ontologies,25 themselves generally drawing from a Spinozan/Deleuzian understanding 
of the body. Thus, for Deleuze, “a body can be anything: it can be an animal, a body 
of sounds, a mind or idea; it can be a linguistic corpus, a social body, a collectivity.”26 
All bodies are assemblages, namely aggregations of human and nonhuman bodies 
that are contingent upon the conditions of their emergence and which do not 
presuppose the centrality, and certainly not the exclusive presence, of the human. 
What is more, assemblages are both actual, namely space and matter, and virtual, 
namely potential, but still real. Actual and virtual are not found in a dialectical 
opposition; nor does the actual determine the virtual.27 Rather, there is no ontological 
distinction between the two, and if anything, the actual is determined through its folding 
with the virtual. In this sense, current weakness or at least lack of strength is always 
affected by the virtual potential of its evolution into a much stronger body. Post-colonial 
environmental legal studies amply show both how the various positions of the bodies 
(North/South, urban poor versus urban elite, and so on) are artificially maintained in 
positions of subjugation due to capitalist interests; and how these positions can and 
do change, usually according to a neoliberal economic machine that encourages 
growth at the expense of environmental protection.28
So, if all bodies are assemblages and if no body has a definitive contour, how do 
bodies differentiate themselves from each other? How do singularities emerge from 
the continuum? These singularities emerge through ruptures. Ruptures interrupt the 
continuum, cutting the links between bodies and allowing 
differences/individualities/subjectivities and eventually singularities to emerge. In 
thinking of the continuum, I have been inevitably influenced by Foucaultian biopolitics 
because its sovereignty is diffused and embodied in each participating body. It differs 
from the biopolitical, however, because it is characterised by the persistent erection of 
boundaries in the form of ruptures without predetermined ethical value. Ruptures can 
be both positive differences that encourage identity, as well as exclusions or 
hierarchies that discourage specific kinds of identity; they can be conflicts (necessary 
or engineered) as well as Deleuzian folds, namely co-emerging assemblages, and 
24 G Deleuze, Cours Vincennes: Sur Spinoza, 17.02.1981 in L Lambert, The Funambulist 
Pamphlets 01: Spinoza (New York, Punctum Books, 2013) 74.
25 See for example D Coole and S Frost, New Materialisms: Ontology, Agency and Politics 
(Durham, Duke University Press, 2010); Bennett, Vibrant Matter; Thrift, 2007.
26 G Deleuze, Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, trans. R Hurley (San Francisco, City Light Books, 
1988) 127.
27 G Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement-Image (London, Athlone Press, 1986).
28 See C Gonzalez, ‘Bridging the North-South Divide: International Environmental Law in the 
Anthropocene’ (2015) 32 Pace Environmental Law (PELR) Review, 407; S Humphreys and Y 
Otomo, ‘Theorising International Environmental Law’ in F Hoffmann and A Orford (eds) The 
Oxford Handbook of International Legal Theory (Oxford, Oxford UP, 2014).
therefore ontological differentiations and ‘gatherings’; they can also be epistemological 
necessities: we need to differentiate, according to the foundational fantasy of 
distinction between self and environment, as Teresa Brennan writes.29 Whatever they 
are, ruptures remain part of the continuum. Rather than annulling it, ruptures nourish 
the continuum, which can be thought of as a (continuous) series of ruptures. I have 
employed the term continuum in different contexts, but it is consistently characterised 
by this one quality: it is always ruptured, indeed self-ruptured, through foldings and 
distinctions on its surface. Sometimes illusionary necessities and other times 
ontological facts, ruptures are the locus of singularity in the continuum. Ruptures 
constitute the continuum, to the point that one is left only with a continuity of ruptures. 
Through ruptures, bodies differentiate themselves from other bodies. According to 
Spinoza, bodies differentiate themselves on the basis of their differentiated velocities 
or pauses – it is all about how a body moves or rests. A human body will be faster 
than a chair will be faster than the plant will be faster than the fossil, and all of them 
will be slower than a typhoon. Rupture enables a difference in movement that results 
in a repeated difference. Yet, precisely because the continuum is a series of ruptures, 
ruptures do not rupture the continuum as such: they are all inscribed within. So, the 
continuum is crossed by lines that produce meaning, while continuously being 
ruptured by them. Lisa Blackman in her seminal work on the body,30 has called this 
the problem of ‘the one and the many’, namely the ontological difficulty of being 
coherent yet multiple, in other words, self yet othering. Karen Barad has introduced 
the term “agential separability” to signal the need for boundaries between bodies.31 
These boundaries are not placed as fixed constructions between subject and object, 
human and non-human, or indeed animate and inanimate. Rather, they emerge in 
order to produce meaning relative to the continuum on which the boundary appears. I 
understand this as a rupture that brings agency forth without flattening it to an all-
connected ontology. It is significant that these boundaries are not conceptualised as 
either prior or immutable: they are drawn every time as part of the emergence of 
differentiated bodies – namely, the emergence of agency. The main challenge is how 
to avoid categorising either continuum or rupture as inferior, namely how to escape 
the trap of mapping them “onto differentiations made between the civilized and the 
primitive, the superior and the inferior, the simple and the complex, and the impulsive 
and the environmental.”32 Indeed, how not to make rupture and continuum a dialectic 
of opposites, namely a question of positive presence and negative absence, but a 
folding co-emergence.
This is also the challenge for the Anthropocene: to put it more concretely, how to 
manage the fact that humans are everywhere, affecting the geology and future history 
of the Earth even after our extinction, while at the same time being embedded in a 
continuum of indistinguishability. As the editors of New Materialisms Diana Coole and 
Samantha Frost write, we have moved away from an epoch where
agents are exclusively humans who possess the cognitive abilities, 
intentionality, and freedom to make autonomous decisions and the corollary 
presumption that humans have the right or ability to master nature. Instead, the 
29 T Brennan, The Transmission of Affect (Ithaca and London, Cornell University Press, 2004).
30 L Blackman, Immaterial Bodies (London, Sage, 2012).
31 K Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the Entanglement of Matter 
and Meaning (Durham, Duke University Press, 2006) 175.
32 Blackman, Immaterial Bodies, 59.
human species is being relocated within a natural environment whose material 
forces themselves manifest certain agentic capacities and in which the domain 
of unintended or unanticipated effects is considerably broadened.33
For environmental law, this means that there can no longer be a boundary between a 
body and its environment. The main find of the Anthropocene is that our presence on 
the Earth necessarily includes our “environment”, whether “natural” or otherwise. We 
are always in an assemblage with the planet. A body is an assemblage of various 
conditions and materialities. Eben Kirksey’s multispecies families34 is an example of 
such an assemblage containing human and animal bodies, discursive bodies of 
economics, politics and law, conservation agencies, wildlife experts, government 
agents and hobbyists, specific spatialities, affects from gentleness to aggression, and 
so on. The total sum of these connections constitutes a body that is internally ruptured 
in an infinity of modalities.35 
The Anthropocene, therefore, invites us to think of a grammar of continuum and 
ruptures, of ruptured continuum and continuous ruptures. These are heuristic tools, 
indeed a vocabulary or at least a mode of thinking that allows disciplines such as 
environmental law to extend on the ways it is intimately connected to everything else 
by engaging with the indistinguishability of bodies, and also accept the need for 
differentiation and draw it in a velocity and mode that serves its purpose. This enables 
the law to question the unchallenged perpetuation of such existing accepted 
assemblages as environment and economy, or sustainability and growth, and start 
experimenting with different assemblages that include the non-human in its ruptured 
polyvalence. 
3. Anthropocenic Theoretical Perspective
Claire Colebrook writes: “the anthropocene thought experiment also alters the 
modality of geological reading, not just to refer to the past as it is for us, but also to 
our present as it will be without us. We imagine a viewing or reading in the absence of 
viewers or readers, and we do this through images in the present that extinguish the 
dominance of the present.”36 The perspective is changing radically. The Anthropocene 
demands an epistemological distance from the object of study, both spatially and 
temporally. In order to observe the effects of the human onto the Earth, we must 
withdraw from it: spatially to get an understanding of the way the crust of the Earth is 
altering due to our presence; temporally and into the future of a human extinction, “in 
the absence of viewers or readers”, where the planet returns to its slowness after that 
brief human interval.
33 Coole and Frost, New Materialisms, 10.
34 E Kirksey, ‘Multispecies Families, Capitalism, and the Law’ in I Braverman (ed.), Lively 
Legalities (London, Routledge, 2016); see also J Lorrimer, ‘Multinatural geographies for the 
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These notions perhaps seem too large for environmental law. They open up existential 
gushes that have little to do with the day-to-day operations of, say, the laws on 
pollution. As Upendra Baxi writes, “the question of urgency of global social policy is 
often considered vast enough to permit the luxury of ethical deliberation.”37 But if the 
Anthropocene is to be heeded, this has to change. An environmental law open to the 
ruptured continuum must adopt a different, more ethically situated perspective to the 
one traditionally understood. The anthropocenic perspective I am suggesting here is 
the fold between, on the one hand, a withdrawal of the law from the object in hand, in 
order for a planetary jurisprudence to emerge; and, on the other, an immersion to the 
geological strata of law with an aim of understanding a mineralised jurisprudence.
I employ withdrawal here as a tool of resistance against an atmosphere of absolute 
inclusion in what Timothy Morton has named hyperobjects: objects characterised by 
viscosity, nonlocality, temporally undulating and constantly phasing. Morton’s prime 
example of a hyperobject is global warming. As a hyperobject, global warming is 
characterised by an absence of distance between the implicated bodies: raindrops on 
our face is global warming, just as the act of flushing away our toilet waste thinking 
that it ends somewhere away. Its viscous nature means that there is no distance 
between here and away. Everything is within, assembling into the continuous space 
of the hyperobject yet at the same time withdrawing from it: global warming is not here 
either. “The octopus of the hyperobject emits a cloud of ink as it withdraws from 
access. Yet this cloud of ink is a cloud of effects and affects.”38 The affects and effects 
left behind are not causal, at least not in the sense of being merely the sign of the 
cause. Rather, they all constitute the hyperobject; but they are often cut into palatable 
pieces of locality and present: they all become little ruptures placed at a distance in 
order to be apprehended. “It’s never the case that those raindrops only fall on my 
head! They are always a manifestation of global warming!”39 These ruptures are also 
part of the object, “are simply the invisible presence of the hyperobject itself, which 
looms around us constantly.”40 In their phasing, objects appear only partially, as 
indexical signs of their spatiotemporal distribution, and never in their entirety. Indeed, 
what is there to appear in global warming, if not the entire Earth, fractal and 
multiscalar, apprehended by different systems, such as politics, media, science, 
economics, ecology, and so on, all putting between themselves and the hyperobject a 
desperately constructed distance of observation? How can it present itself, and to 
whom, if everyone is implicated in this hyperobjective implicate order of global 
warming? We are all in it, complicitly constituting its continuum.
The total inclusiveness of the hyperobject (which is not of course just climate change 
but also the Earth’s environmental degradation as a whole) is an aspect of the 
continuum from which environmental law needs to withdraw and resemiologise. The 
operations of the hyperobject need to be conceived as a whole in an integrated, 
planetary manner, however strong the gravitation attraction of the hyperobject might 
be. The Anthropocene offers just this possibility of withdrawal. Clare Colebrook writes: 
“the positing of the anthropocene era relies on looking at our own world and imagining 
it as it will be when it has become the past…We can see, now, from changes in the 
37 U Baxi, ‘Towards a climate change justice theory?’ (2016) 7 Journal of Human Rights and 
the Environment, 7, 10.
38 Morton, Hyperobjects, 39.
39 Morton, Hyperobjects, 48.
40 Morton, Hyperobjects, 7.
earth’s composition that there will be a discernible strata that—in a manner akin to our 
dating of the earth’s already layered geological epochs—will be readable.”41 The 
withdrawal is both spatial and temporal, planet-embracing and future-tending.
Environmental law needs to see the whole hyperobject (or at least attempt a 
construction) as a planetary problem, and elevate the planet on an agentic level. Only 
subsequently can environmental law define its own role accordingly. As Rory Rowan 
writes, “whereas ‘the global’ suggests a relatively flat, anthropocentric conception of 
the Earth focused on the construction of social relations on the surface, ‘the planetary’, 
by contrast, points to a more complex, volumic, stratified understanding of an Earth 
constituted through dynamic geo-social entanglements. Accordingly, the 
Anthropocene creates opportunities to cast the planet itself as a key player in the 
drama of human politics rather than simply its stage.”42 The role of environmental law 
in this is pivotal, as long as it starts thinking in terms of the planet rather than in the 
old geopolitical terms of globality (this does not only apply to international 
environmental law but also very much to regional and national manifestations). Such 
a shift would come about with a withdrawal from given legal mechanisms such as the 
standard balance of interests and legalistic issues of interest, harm and proof. 
Environmental law must perform a withdrawal from the very inclusivity of this 
hyperobject: if it carries on operating within it, environmental law falls victim to the 
devastating rhetoric of piecemeal action and generally accepted impossibility of 
actually doing anything radical enough that will halt environmental decline. In a way, 
environmental law needs to stop being so thoroughly law and begin becoming more 
environmental: to withdraw from itself and its own habitual legal mechanisms and to 
move to a different plane from where the issue of environmental degradation will 
appear as a whole, in its all-ingesting hyperobject presence. From there on, preventive 
action must be given priority over economic interests and lack of scientific proof, in 
accordance to a more idealised (but critically realistic, in view of the conditions) 
understanding of the precautionary principle; issues of intergenerational equity on a 
planetary scale that includes the future of human extinction must tangibly affect every 
legal decision and in course change the core of environmental law, from a generally 
rather conservative, piecemeal and overtly technical legal branch to the visionary, 
open and given to futurity way of legal thinking and acting that it could be.
On the other side of withdrawal lies immersion. It begins with the fact, suggested by 
Timothy Morton,43 that we are witnessing the end of the biologically-determined 
human subject and the inauguration of a distributed humanity operating as a 
geological agent. Humanity and its activities can no longer be understood as mere 
thought advances, or even corporeally embedded presences, but significantly as 
mineralised temporalities. Kathryn Yussof puts it clearly: “[t]he Anthropocene can be 
seen as a remineralization that is prompting reflection of the future fossilization of 
humanity…This is largely a result of being able to ‘take up’ a bloated payload of 
geologic force, courtesy of fossil fuels. In this sense the Anthropocene represents a 
moment of acknowledgement of a geologic social body politic, but in which our 
41 Colebrook, Death of the PostHuman, 26.
42 R Rowan, ‘Notes on politics after the Anthropocene’ (2014) in E Johnson et al. (eds) Special 
Issue ‘After the Anthropocene: Politics and geographic inquiry for a new epoch’ Progress in 
Human Geography, 38, 3, 439, 448
43 T Morton, The Ecological Thought (Harvard University Press 2010).
discourses for the critique of power (i.e. biopolitics) are configured to a version of ‘life’ 
that does not take account of this geology.”44 The Anthropocene presents us with a 
depth (of subjectivity, politics, law) that has so far been excluded, and in which we 
need to immerse ourselves: the geological depth and its effect on existing discussions 
on biopolitical control. What will happen to the law if it considers the mineralisation of 
the body? The law will be required to immerse itself deeper in the geology of the 
Anthropocene and, once again, reconsider its basic notions. Think, for example, of the 
understanding of private property as a fundamental human right. In the light of 
anthropocenic mineralisation, property becomes a planetary loan that has relied on 
the overexploitation (a “bloated payload”) of fossil fuels. Property becomes less 
secure, less exclusionary, much more permeable. It needs to accommodate the logic 
of geologic circularity, namely the eventual fossilisation of humanity, and indeed the 
vanity of it all. It moves increasingly towards a much more expanded understanding of 
commons. 
Immersion entails an acknowledgement of chthuloid (namely, of the deep Earth) 
verticality and a serious engagement with the ethical consequences of such an 
acknowledgement. This is what Donna Haraway has called the Chthulucene, namely 
an epoch which gives priority to the constant assemblaging of human with other 
nonhuman materialities.45 Haraway prefers this to the Anthropocene because it 
describes more accurately the constant implication of the human with other Earthly 
entities rather than artificially detaching the human from the assemblage. As Kathryn 
Yussof puts it, “considering the human within geologic time poses the problem of 
thinking an inhuman milieu, both before, after and internal to ‘us.’”46 The inhuman, 
namely the geological, becomes part of the human and expands it from within. What 
is more, the Anthropocene demands a geophilosophical situatedness of thought in 
relation to the Earth. Reza Negarestani writes: “geophilosophy is a philosophy that 
grasps thought in relation to earth and territory…it is a philosophy that, perhaps 
unconsciously, grasps thought in relation to two traumas, one precipitated by the 
accretion of the earth and the other ensued by the determination of the territory. Whilst 
the former trauma lies in the consolidation of the earth as a planetary ark for terrestrial 
life against the cosmic backdrop, the latter is brought about by a combined geographic 
and demographic determination of a territory against the exteriority of the terrestrial 
plane and fluxes of populations of all kinds.”47 These two traumas, distinctly 
anthropocentric and a direct effect of the Anthropocene, are also specifically legal. 
They both require an intervention that guarantees limits, while at the same time 
allocating responsibility. This is an anthropocentric legality that chops up the surface 
of the Earth in territorial modes that include other populations as resources (rather 
than allowing for multiple territories in terms of animal populations); and then delegates 
44 K Yussof, ‘Anthropogenesis: Origins and Endings in the Anthropocene’ (2016) Theory, 
Culture & Society, 33, 2, 5.
45 See ‘Anthropocene, Capitalocene, Chthulucene: Staying with the Trouble’, a lecture given 
by Donna Haraway at University of California, Santa Cruz on 5th September 2014, available 
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the whole Earth to the status of resource (‘ark’) for the human future. A 
geophilosophical position attempts to mend these traumas through the only way 
possible. Colebrook writes: “the anthropocene thought experiment also alters the 
modality of geological reading, not just to refer to the past as it is for us, but also to 
our present as it will be without us. We imagine a viewing or reading in the absence of 
viewers or readers, and we do this through images in the present that extinguish the 
dominance of the present.”48 
Rethinking the basics would also include the very term  ‘Anthropocene’ which will need 
to be ruptured too: not all can be equal in terms of their responsibility towards the 
overexploitation of resources. As Chakrabarty writes, 49 the Anthropocene risks 
becoming another totalising imposition (a hyperobject?) flattening historical and 
geographical injustices and presenting a total, unified humanity in terms of the share 
of systematic destruction of nature. In other words, “how humanity is deployed as a 
method of erasure that obfuscates climate racism, social injustice in fossil fuels, and 
differentiated histories of responsibilities through homogenization in a ‘we’ of the 
Anthropocene.”50 The tilt in the continuum disrupts the happy flatness of some of the 
Anthropocenic rhetoric. We are not one humanity facing its responsibility before the 
Anthropocene. Rather, we are a continuum of ruptured shares, some more, some less 
(no one however with no share in the responsibility).
The continuum changes: rather than flat, it is now revealed to be manifold, full of 
fissures and deep ruptures. Environmental law in the Anthropocene is to cultivate “a 
depth relation that is something like a charge in its fathoming of deep, underground 
spaces.”51 Inhuman (geology) and non-human (biology) constitute the assemblage of 
what the human is in the epoch of the Anthropocene. In other words, the responsibility 
in the Anthropocene epoch is one of both withdrawal and immersion: withdraw from 
the present in order to read it as nonhuman future; withdraw from centrality while 
retaining omnipresence; withdraw from the given legal mechanisms in order to 
withdraw from the hyperobject. But also, immerse ourselves in the geophilosophical 
understanding of the human; immerse the law in a mineralisation that extends into a 
deep future; and immerse into the differentiated responsibility that humanity has in the 
face of anthropocenic environmental degradation.
 
4. Anthropocenic Methodology: Critical Environmental Law
There is no question that the Anthropocene affects the way environmental legal 
research and thinking in general should take place. But the Anthropocene is not an 
isolated move. If it were, it would not have captured the collective imagination the way 
it has. It is one more stage in the recent evolution towards a more embedded, material 
thinking about the human and the world at large. What has started with Catherine 
48 Colebrook Death of the PostHuman, 30.
49 D Chakrabarty, ‘The Climate of history: Four theses’ (2009) 35 Critical Inquiry, 197.
50 Yussof, Anthropogenesis, 6-7.
51 Yussof, Geologic Subjects, 401.
Merchant’s Death of Nature52 and carried on with Deep Ecology and post-ecologism,53 
has now found an outlet in arguably more supra-disciplinary ventures such as the 
spatial turn, the corporeal turn, the affective turn, and such philosophical currents of 
thought as posthumanism, new ontologies, new materialism and speculative realism. 
The Anthropocene is an addition to this long yet compact thinking evolution, and brings 
the need for an expansive thinking and acting, a differential understanding of space 
and time in terms of depth, a need for strategic withdrawal for hyper-inclusion, and a 
reconfiguration of human exceptionalism. 
In what follows, I would like to offer four theses on Critical Environmental Law in order 
to show how they are affected by the Anthropocene. This is not a programmatic 
description of how things should be solved, but suggestions for a methodology of 
environmental law in the epoch of the Anthropocene, which demands a 
conceptualisation of environmental law that moves beyond the usual distinctions 
between anthropocentrism and ecocentrism; unproblematised distinctions between 
environment and human; and standard methodologies of legal access to knowledge.
4.1.An Ontologised Environmental Law
“With the arrival of the Anthropocene, this division [between human/nonhuman or 
nature/culture] is de-ontologized; as such, the separation appears instead as an 
epistemological product mistakenly presumed as a given fact of being.”54 The 
Anthropocene brings to the fore an ontology of continuous connection between 
bodies. In so doing, it instructs us to question the well-trodden paths of epistemology, 
and begin placing them in a wider context. Why is it that human rationality needed this 
rupture between human/nonhuman? Why this need to naturalise what should have 
remained transparent epistemological distinctions, arguably necessary to understand 
the world, but ultimately misleading and obscuring of the ontology of the continuum? 
Continuing in this vein, one would be forced to question that major distinction between 
epistemology and ontology:55 can we afford to carry on allowing Eurocentric, 
Capitalocenic,56 neoliberal, market-originating epistemological tools to determine what 
we take as ontological truths? Can such a distinction seriously be maintained in view 
of the fact that the Anthropocene also augurs the de-individualisation of the human in 
favour of a human collectivisation as a geological agent that affects the Earth,57 and 
further a human fossilisation as a return to the Earth as the a priori agent? This 
ontological take would affect environmental law in two main ways: first, it would 
collapse the distinction of a mechanistic, slow, procedure-led environmental law on 
the one hand, and an urgent tool of rapid dealing of environmental degradation on the 
other, that would deal with the issues as a priority and on a planetary level where 
52 C Merchant, The Death of Nature: Women, Ecology and the Scientific Revolution (Wildwood 
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Humanities Press, 2013) 8.
55 See R Brasier, ‘Concepts and Objects’ in L Bryant, N Srnicek and G Harman (eds) The 
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resources are not about economic capabilities of access but about geological 
finitudes. The method of accessing knowledge (epistemology) is responsible for the 
construction of such knowledge – thus, if environmental law follows a method of slow 
legal deliberation, it also generates a reality filled with unresolvable problems. Second, 
the ontological practice of the Anthropocene demands the collapse of traditional 
disciplinary boundaries, further fossilised by research councils, discipline-specific 
assessment exercises, and sclerotic university structures that operate along obsolete 
disciplinary distinctions.
4.2.A Material Environmental Law
Critical environmental law can no longer hide behind the usual legal logocentric 
panoply that insulates environmental law from materiality. We now know that, as 
Austin Sarat writes, “the law is all over”:58 this is a call to claim law’s spatial, corporeal, 
emotional, sensory presence that has been subsumed to the critique of discourse. 
More than other legal disciplines, environmental law is exposed to its own materiality: 
dealings with scientific thresholds, ecological catastrophes, urban poverty, sick bodies 
and polluted atmospheres. Above all, the Anthropocene shows that environmental law 
is already itself a body,59 namely an assemblage of various materialities, spaces and 
disciplines. As a body, environmental law is both singular and part of the continuum: 
it affects and is affected by other bodies. Environmental law must be thought critically, 
as a multi-layered, planetary, fragmented discipline, characterised by horizontalities 
that follow the transboundary nature of pollution and verticalities that reach deep into 
the planet’s space and time. There is no more room for such antiquated debates as 
anthropocentrism versus ecocentrism.60 The Anthropocene has exposed the grand 
paradox of the absence of centre. To be a singularity amidst a plane of other 
singularities entails a radical acentricity, which is much more than a call for the 
inclusion of uncertainty in environmental law. Rather, it is an invitation to a praxis-
oriented, spatially specific, material approach that considers every problem in its 
singularity. 
4.3.A Mineralised Environmental Law
Environmental legal agency in the era of Critical Environmental Law cannot be limited 
to humans. The earlier posthuman understanding of the human as an assemblage is 
enough to cloud the agentic certainty. The Anthropocenic mineralisation of thought 
introduces an agentic tripartite: human (as assemblage, without contours), nonhuman 
(assemblages where the biological – animals and plants – but not the human prevails), 
inhuman (assemblages where the mineral prevails). Any carving of agency from the 
58 A Sarat, ‘ “…The Law is All Over”: Power, Resistance and the Legal Consciousness of the 
Welfare Poor’ (1990) Yale Journal of Law and Humanities, 2, 2, 343.
59 This is why, as D Houston (2013) ‘Crisis Is Where We Live: Environmental Justice for the 
Anthropocene’, Globalizations, 10, 3, 439, points out, we must not forget the existing 
environmental narratives of environmental activism but built on their successes and carry on 
with local action.
60 see my take on this in ‘Epistemologies of Doubt’, in A Grear and L Kotzé (eds), Research 
Handbook On Human Rights And The Environment (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2015).
continuum requires a rupture, often artificial and arbitrary.61 Critical environmental law, 
however, must move towards a closer reading of the Anthropocenic geological 
circularity (life has always originated in and will always return to minerals) and consider 
issues such as the recognition of legal agency of bodies such as mineral formations 
(such as fossil fuels) and even the planet as a whole.62 
4.4.A Situated Environmental Law
Human exceptionalism must be managed in order to create the conditions for 
assuming responsibility, regardless of proof of causal link. There is no doubt that 
humans are only one participant in the environmental decline, but also, as the 
Anthropocene has taught us, they are always a participant, always situated within the 
ecological conditions of our planet. Strict liability for historical anthropocenic 
environmental degradation is consonant with assemblage-thinking, where all bodies 
are complicit with the degradation. However, the responsibility is not flat. Depending 
on where each body is situated in the assemblage, the responsibility changes. This is 
not about proof but about historical presence. It is clear that responsibility now 
becomes situational:  it is the juridical responsibility of situating one’s body within an 
assemblage. Responsibility needs to be thought of as extended, namely both material 
and unrestricted by the immediate or the local. Doreen Massey puts this as “the 
Russian Dolls issue of care and responsibility: we always begin with the proximate, 
home, and then move outwards. But care diminishes as we move out.”63 We might 
think we try to be “responsible” about our presence in a locality, even a locality that 
“thinks globally,” as the motto goes. But the problem is much vaster. Timothy Morton 
writes: “the problem goes beyond how to dispose of human-sized things, like the stuff 
that gets flushed down a toilet. What should we do about substances on whose inside 
we find ourselves?”64 Critical environmental law is expected to situate itself at a 
distance from the hyperobject of environmental degradation and yet immerse itself in 
the geologic verticality of responsibility. This is the way to encourage that humans 
assume their responsibility in relation to their position in the planetary assemblage.
5. Conclusion
These theses are mere indications of how environmental law can remodel itself 
critically by taking into consideration some of the important challenges of the 
Anthropocene. This is neither an easy, nor a unilateral task. Environmental law itself 
is part of an assemblage of material and immaterial bodies and to a large extent is 
bound by the general continuum around it. It can, however, organise itself politically 
and start withdrawing from the traditionally understood legal methodology. What is 
more, it bears a particular responsibility to do so – more than any other branch of law, 
61 For agentic emergence in the law, see A Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, ‘Lively Agency: Life 
and Law in the Anthropocene’, in I Braverman, Lively Legalities (London, Routledge, 2016).
62 especially the latter is connected to what A Neimanis, C Åsberg and J Hedréncall, ‘Four 
Problems, Four Directions For Environmental Humanities: Toward Critical Posthumanities For 
the Anthropocene’, (2015) Ethics & Environment 20, 1, 67, call the problem of 
compartmentalization of environmental questions. 
63 D Massey, ‘Geographies of Responsibility’ (2004) Geografiska Annaler, Series B, Human 
Geography, Special Issue: The Political Challenge of Relational Space 86, 1, 5, 9.
64 Morton, Hyperobjects, 140.
environmental law needs to reflect critically on what is expected of it and how to 
achieve it. And when bodies move, the assemblage often moves along and the 
continuum’s tilt might change a little.
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